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World-political reﬂections in historical perspective—as distinct from liberal-
normative self-congratulations—have been a rarity in postwar federal 
Germany. Even the short-lived post-reuniﬁcation hubris that incited seces-
sions in Slovenia and Croatia failed to hasten a resumption and updating 
of the rich and disturbing Prusso-German discourse of Machtpolitik in 
academia and policy circles. The discursive hegemony of the ‘power of the 
better argument’, and its Genscherite geopolitical pendant of Atlanticist 
multilateralism and chequebook foreign policy, remained too entrenched. 
To all appearances, the Luftwaffe’s reappearance in Balkan skies, wing-tip 
to wing-tip with nato allies in the bombing of Yugoslavia, merely uncorked 
another round of Kantian celebrations. A threshold, nevertheless, had been 
crossed. Three years into the war in Iraq, publicly deplored but clandestinely 
assisted by Schroeder and Fischer, Herfried Münkler’s Imperien has broken 
self-imposed taboos by bracketing—naturally, without repudiating—ethical 
considerations, for a comparative enquiry into the transhistorical ‘logic of 
empire’, with gratifying sales and critical reception in the Federal Republic.
Emblematic of intellectual and political mutations under way in the 
Germany of the turning century, its author began his career in left-leaning 
milieux at Frankfurt University in the 1970s and 1980s. By background a hist-
orian of ideas, he was a student, assistant and collaborator of Iring Fetscher, 




in due course Münkler himself became a long-time member of the editorial 
board of mega, the projected 114-volume Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe. A dis-
sertation on Machiavelli led to a Habilitationsschrift on the rise of the idea of 
raison d’État in early modern Europe, and thence to a co-edited ﬁve-volume 
history of political ideas, preoccupations with Clausewitz and Schmitt, 
and eventually towards a military sociology of war, terrorism and parti-
san warfare. An editor for many years of the Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 
the country’s leading political science journal, Münkler now adorns the 
Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Science, and holds the Chair for Political 
Theory at the Humboldt University in Berlin, a position to which he was 
appointed in 1992 after the political purges of hold-outs from the old regime 
at this former East German ﬂagship university. Once a commentator in 
Tageszeitung—Berlin’s nearest equivalent to a radical, counter-cultural left 
daily, however invertebrate—today he is lauded by Die Zeit and regaled by 
the German Foreign Ofﬁce, to whose Ambassadors’ Conference Imperien 
was originally presented in 2004 as an aide-mémoire. 
Designed as a comparative historical sociology of empires, Imperien 
seeks to distil the essential characteristics and dynamics of empire as an 
ideal-typical concept, with a view to clarifying current American projects 
and necessary European responses to them. Though compact in extent, the 
book is vast in scope, ranging from nomadic empires of the Central Asian 
steppes, via the Hochkulturen, to the Greek, Persian, Roman and Chinese 
imperial orders and on to Ottoman, Portuguese, Dutch, Spanish, French, 
Russian, British and Soviet successors. Declaratively, Münkler’s interest lies 
not so much in drawing lessons from this array of past experiences, as in 
identifying regularities across the historical spectrum that work themselves 
out largely independent of the volition of their protagonists. ‘Political phys-
ics’ not ‘political prudence’ is to hold centre stage. The ‘imperatives’ rather 
than the ‘politics’ of empire are what matters. ‘An approach that inquires 
into the logic of empire and its imperatives of action attributes minor signi-
ﬁcance to the inﬂuence and decisions of actors. It rather seeks to identify 
those structures and premises that deﬁne their room for manoeuvre’. 
What are then, for Münkler, the essential components of empires? If 
states are classically deﬁned by sovereignty, bordered territoriality and 
homogeneous internal integration, generating reciprocal and (in principle) 
juridically equal international relations, empires are not simply larger ver-
sions of them—magniﬁed, but comparably demarcated, units in a geopolitical 
pluriverse. They are something quite distinct: systems of rule surrounded by 
political communities (clients or satellites) of lesser and dependent status, 
open to constant intervention and direct and indirect political management. 
Within such empires, too, there is always an internal gradient of uneven 





periphery, with semi-porous and shifting frontier-zones that tend to let out 
but only selectively let in. No grand strategy is discernible during their initial 
formation—Seeley’s conceit that the British Empire was founded ‘in a ﬁt 
of absence of mind’ is generalized with gusto. Imperial dynamics are not 
reducible to the impact of the centre on the periphery, but co-determined 
by interactions between the two. If military might and economic power are 
the mainstay of empires, they also require a legitimating discourse that 
holds out the prospect of attraction into the imperial fold—eternal peace, 
prosperity, civilization, free markets, democracy-promotion, human rights. 
This mission constitutes a self-binding discourse, rather than an ideology 
in the classical sense; it is neither a set of conscious fabrications nor a form 
of self-delusion, but a normative pledge that at once restrains imperial rule 
and relegates those who oppose it to barbarity. If power of attraction fails, a 
just war can be proclaimed that criminalizes the enemy by imposing a new 
international legal order—iustus hostis becomes a rogue state. Internally, the 
mission rallies the metropolitan population by rationalizing and legitimiz-
ing ﬁscal and military sacriﬁces.
True empires, Münkler insists, if they want to be Weltreiche and not 
mere Großreiche, require not only an imposing expansion in space but 
also a substantial duration over time. Crucially, they need to be capable 
of trans-generational regeneration after an initial phase of charismatic 
take-off has exhausted itself. On this count—conveniently, of course, for 
current purposes—the Napoleonic, Bismarckian and Nazi (even, more per-
versely, Japanese) ventures drop out of the picture. Indeed, real empires 
need to have passed through at least one cycle of rise and decline, plus a 
renewed period of ascent. Spatially, empires tend to be co-extensive with 
their ‘worlds’ in the sense that imperial co-existence and co-recognition 
is a contradiction in terms, leading inescapably to inter-imperial con-
ﬂict. Exception is made for those cases where ‘parallel empires’ co-exist, 
but failed to interact due to their mutual geographical isolation, as in the 
case of Imperial Rome and Han China. The historical trend line, in any 
case, leads to a spatial congruence between a single empire and the globe 
(henceforward including outer space), even though the move towards 
informal empire imparts a transglobal, rather than a global, character to 
the American project. While Münkler notionally allows for hegemony as a 
possible third category, deﬁned as predominance over a group of formally 
equal actors in which the hegemon assumes the position of primus inter 
pares, in practice his essential classiﬁcation of political communities is 
exhausted by a fundamental state-empire dualism.
What are the distinct imperatives of imperial rule? Within their sphere 
of domination, empires are compelled to political or military intervention 
to maintain their credibility, prestige and, ultimately, power and inﬂuence. 
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Here neutrality is not an option: Thucydides’s Melian Dialogue sets out the 
reasons why satellites must be kept engaged in and subordinated to the 
common imperial project. Melos could not stay out of Athens’s conﬂict with 
Sparta; in more recent idiom, ‘who is not for us is against us’. For their part, 
inter-imperial relations are governed by permanent geopolitical competition 
over relative standing, a drive towards hierarchization grounded in the 
demands of power politics and manifested in a series of asymmetric—
typically proxy—wars, conducted against minor peripheral powers. These 
signal prestige and strike-capacity to imperial rivals. Ultimately, inter-
imperial hegemonic wars decide the fate of the world order. 
If the theoretical construction so far offers a quasi-realist account of geo-
political force ﬁelds, in a central chapter Münkler returns to the domestic 
politics that govern the trajectory of empires. Here, after evoking Polybius’s 
and Machiavelli’s political cycles, Münkler appeals to Michael Mann’s four 
sources of power (ideological, economic, military and political) and Michael 
Doyle’s notion of an ‘Augustan threshold’, to reject either economistic or 
uni-cyclical models of imperial ascent and descent, for multi-factor and 
pluri-cyclical explanations of the variable rhythms of rise and decline. Of 
the latter two theoretical crutches, more is made of the second than the ﬁrst. 
In Doyle’s version, the Augustan moment signiﬁes a series of fundamen-
tal constitutional and moral reforms—in Rome, Octavian’s sealing of the 
transition from de-centralized republicanism to re-centralized authoritarian 
rule—in which empires terminate their phases of military expansion and 
enter long periods of socio-political consolidation and imperial order.
The post-threshold era turns an exploitative centre–periphery relation 
based on military might into a homogeneous zone of civilized peace; 
arbitrary proconsular exactions into empire-wide ﬁscal regulation; and 
differentiated political status amongst conquered peoples into a common 
imperial citizenship; it diffuses prosperity through widespread investment 
and infrastructural projects. Octavian’s successful conversion of military into 
political power, a bureaucratic revolution implemented by an incorruptible 
administrative elite, transmuted the predatory imperialism of the res publica 
romana into a beneﬁcent imperium romanum, capped by the new ideology of 
the pax romana. There followed a century of imperial stability and glory, and 
though decline set in after Trajan, it was staggered, halted and even sporadi-
cally reversed by further reforms associated with the names of Diocletian, 
Constantine and Theodosius. Münkler concludes that ‘political communi-
ties traverse several cycles of rise and decline and the number of cycles and 
the duration of each empire at the cyclical zenith depends essentially on the 
abilities and prudence of their leading politicians’. This startling volte-face, 
ﬂatly contradicting his initial insistence on the primacy of structural condi-





After discussing the ascent and consolidation of empires, Münkler 
moves to the logic of their decline. Here he abandons his structural-
ist programme, shifting towards a more dynamic model of action and 
counter-action. If not directly defeated in inter-imperial wars, empires 
run the familiar risks of overstretch and over-commitment—a mismatch 
between aspirations and resources, already conceptualized by Clausewitz 
as the point of culmination in a military campaign after which the costs of 
an offensive outrun its returns. Typically, such overstretch requires with-
drawal from economically and strategically secondary regions. While this 
line of argument is unexceptionable, if mechanistic, Münkler is on some-
what more original ground in his discussion of the asymmetric strategies 
developed by anti-imperial forces. By blending their own insurgencies with 
hegemonic conﬂicts, national liberation movements can instrumental-
ize inter-imperial rivalries for their own purposes, as Serbia’s provocation 
of Austria-Hungary generated the inter-imperial war between the Triple 
Alliance and Triple Entente in 1914. No less effective and equally common 
is partisan warfare: avoidance of pitched battles and refusal to capitulate, 
followed by a protracted war of attrition between the occupying power and 
underground forces carrying out low-intensity but surgical strikes against 
it—the Spanish guerrilla against Napoleon, Yugoslav resistance against the 
Nazis, the Algerian, Vietnamese, Afghan and other versions of anti-colonial 
struggle. Partisans win, according to Kissinger, if they do not lose; conven-
tional forces lose, if they do not win.
The logic of partisan warfare, however, ends if formal empire turns into 
informal empire. When that happens, terrorism becomes the most effective 
form of anti-imperial struggle—a new form of strategic-tactical creativity 
against an enemy whose sinews of power are ﬂows of capital and long-
range military-technological surveillance and control. Given the physical 
absence of the imperial power in the indirectly controlled area, terrorists 
have to carry the ﬁght against civilian targets into the centre itself: 9/11. This 
is the main distinction between partisan warfare and terrorism. Common 
to both is a delegitimation of imperial promises—of security, prosperity, 
civilization and legality—in the periphery. Unique to the contemporary 
forms of transnational terrorism is the negation of the imperial discourse 
in the metropolitan heartland, undermining hegemonic legitimacy on its 
home ground by unmasking the limits of its otherwise self-binding mission 
through the provocation of disproportionate reactions: homeland security, 
ﬂouting of international law, demotion of allies to vassals, escalating vio-
lence, culminating in rising costs and higher ﬁscal extractions. 
What further differentiates contemporary terrorism from partisan warfare 
of the last century is the alliance the latter so often struck up with Marxism as 
a recognizable politico-economic programme for an alternative, non-capitalist 
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path of national development. Current international terrorism, by contrast, is 
based on an existentialized anti-imperialism that is a radical version of iden-
tity politics, revolving around religion, ethnos and culture, with no credible 
prospect of catching up with and overtaking market economies. The suicide 
bomber symbolizes this change, which renders any form of compromise or 
co-existence impossible. The aim of transnational terrorism is not liberation, 
but devastation. Strategy and tactics contract into one: war becomes absolute. 
Bids by anti-imperial states to acquire nuclear capacity are efforts to render 
strategic resources more symmetrical once again, securing immunization 
against the provocations of empire. Non-proliferation treaties represent an 
imperial counter-strategy to maintain a critical military-technological lead, 
especially if they go hand in hand with security guarantees to imperial cli-
ents. If unsuccessful, counter-proliferation or pre-emption is on the agenda: 
North Korea stands for immunity, Iraq for counter-proliferation; Iran is cross-
ing the threshold from the latter to the former. 
Imperien sets out explicitly to build a transhistorical model of empire. 
Its subtitle reads: ‘The logic of world domination—from Ancient Rome to 
the United States’. But what is carefully built up as a systematic construct—
traits, imperatives, dynamics, threats—disintegrates, even in the course 
of the text itself, in the face of historical exempliﬁcation. Did all empires 
cross the Augustan threshold? Not Habsburg Spain, not Czarist Russia, 
not Qin China. Did all empires produce an imperial mission of peace- and 
prosperity-promotion in the periphery? Not the nomadic empires of Genghis 
Khan and consorts, not the Spanish Conquistadores, only very unevenly the 
British. Did all empires clash, of necessity, in hegemonic wars of succes-
sion? Not the American and the British, nor even the Soviet and American. 
At every stage along the conceptual chain, it transpires that a plethora of 
variegated, case-speciﬁc determinants, circumscribe and deﬁne the raison 
d’empire of each particular imperium. In other words, what ﬁnally accounts 
for any crossing of an Augustan threshold, imperial cycle, construction of 
ideological mission, management of centre–periphery relations, incidence 
of hegemonic war, onset of decline, turns out to be historically unique con-
stellations of internal and external conditions that frame the policies of the 
ruling order in question.
Thus, as with all such attempts to generate universal concepts from 
sociological ideal-types, Münkler is forced to make continual concessions, 
exemptions and retractions, while simultaneously introducing a range of 
sub-types (land-based versus sea-based, commercial versus military, formal 
versus informal empires) which are themselves subject to further quali-
ﬁcations, as the distance from abstraction to concretion narrows in each 
particular case. In fact, while the book sets out to demonstrate a ubiquitous 





differences in the developmental patterns and external policies of the cases 
it includes. It is this varied historical record that forces Münkler, sotto voce, 
gradually to desist from the universal analytic his work purports to lay out, 
in favour of discrete comments on this or that contingent experience. If, in 
principle, an intellectual strategy employing a set of historical empires to 
select common attributes, capable of forming a reasonably coherent con-
cept with enough deﬁnitional precision to distinguish empires from other 
political communities, may be of some heuristic value, it closes, by the same 
token, any chance of using the same concept to distinguish between different 
imperial experiences. Concept and history remain miles apart. Ultimately, 
Münkler’s notion of empire degenerates and decomposes over the length of 
his book into a hollow semantic shell of little discriminatory power. But what 
else can we expect in a study that covers several millennia? After all, why 
should empires of vastly different size, socio-economic dynamics, institu-
tional make-up, civilizational level, belief-systems, military organization and 
geopolitical environment conform to a common pattern? Why should there 
be one rationality in imperial behaviour—one ‘logic of empire’?
And, of course, there is not. We are left, in effect, with analogy-
mongering. A comparative historical sociology requires explanation of 
speciﬁcities and variations. Does that dictate a retreat from theorization to 
the thick narratives of ideography? By no means. To see why not, we need 
only look at Münkler’s under-explored distinction between informal (non-
territorial and de-politicized) empires, based on commercial ﬂows, and 
formal (politico-military) empires based on territorial conquest. Nowhere is 
this dichotomy, introduced in narrative style, rendered into a clear categori-
cal distinction between capitalist and non-capitalist empires. In fact, such a 
distinction cannot appear in Münkler’s typology since he rejects an inquiry 
into the genesis and social dynamics of empires, opting instead for a politi-
cal sociology of domination topped up with canonical references to Mann. 
How blunt this instrument is can be seen at a glance from the way he goes 
about contrasting empires—Assyrian, Mongol—that reproduce themselves 
through the politico-military extraction of surplus, with empires whose 
essential mechanism of exploitation is based on exchange and commerce:
Military expansion, which unfolds as a rule on land, is politically organized. It 
revolves around a ruler, or politico-military elite, who creates the conditions 
for expansion and directs and organizes military operations. Commercial 
expansion, by contrast, can also be carried out by private agents, often com-
mercial companies . . . It creates no territorially closed domain of rule; rather, 
it combines diverse areas into a composite trading zone, connected through 
trading networks that organize economic exchange.
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According to this argument, the Portuguese, Dutch, British and American 
trading systems represent minor variations of the logic of commercial 
empire building, categorically differentiated from territorialized empires 
based on military power. On closer inspection, however, the distinction 
between public and private, military and commercial, territorial and non-
territorial, land-based and sea-based empires, does not hold up. For although 
semi-private trading enterprises by and large ran the Portuguese, the Dutch 
and early modern British commercial empires, these chartered companies 
remained directly dependent on the political patronage and military power 
of the licence-selling Crown, even in the cases of the Dutch and British joint-
stock companies. This ‘public-private partnership’—an alliance of Crown and 
Company—created in turn the exclusive trans-maritime trading empires in 
which the terms of trade were politically ﬁxed. The monopolization of speciﬁc 
trades and trading-routes required, in turn, the militarization and diplomatic 
protection of their trading networks—convoys, navies, merchant ﬂeets—
generating several co-existing ‘territorialized’ inter-continental, if seaborne, 
empires. In this scenario, inter-imperial rivalry over exclusive trading zones 
took the familiar form of naval conﬂicts. The sea was not open, but closed. 
This form of pre-capitalist exchange and corresponding geopolitical compe-
tition remained premised on the politico-military might of the metropolitan 
heartlands that sought, by means of the political exclusion and regulation of 
competition, to maintain the price differentials between externally linked, 
but not integrated, markets. Windfall proﬁts were collected in the sphere of 
circulation—buying cheap and selling dear. By the same token, a long-term 
equalization of proﬁt-rates for speciﬁc trades across the multiple imperial 
trading zones was impossible to achieve. It follows that there was no world 
market and, thus, could be no world prices. In other words, these politicized 
circuits of exchange created formal empires, even though relatively weak 
powers, like the Portuguese or the Dutch, were often obliged to restrict their 
ambitions to control over ports and strategic trading posts rather than being 
able to incorporate wider hinterlands: confetti empires.
This constellation was only to be supplanted by a free-trade imperialism, 
rather than commerce tout court, on the back of the co-development in early 
modern Britain of a capitalist system of production and capitalist forms of 
sovereignty and imperial dynamics. When such sovereignty became gener-
alized in 19th-century Europe, however, it was never master over its territory, 
but already contained a trans-territorializing logic, expressed in the ﬂows of 
capital that easily crossed borders. In capitalist states, the activities of civil 
society by this time transcended the territorial conﬁnes of ‘their’ states. Trade 
between capitalist states could now assume a form not directly premised on 
geopolitical accumulation and inter-imperialist rivalry, but on economic com-





of capitalist exchange and generalized competition can, in principle, leave 
political territories—multiple sovereignties—intact. In fact, it was often the 
precondition for formally independent state-formation in the post-colonial 
‘periphery’: informal empire. Since Münkler has no concept of capitalism 
(only commercial activity), he has no concept of the origins of capitalism, 
and this leads him to subsume vastly different experiences of seaborne 
exploitation under the common rubric of commercial empires.
Such reﬂections ought not replace one structuralist ideal-type, the logic 
of empire, with another—the logic of capitalism. For even this distinction 
between non-capitalist and capitalist empires is not absolute, as capitalist 
empires adopted strategies of territorialization—the geopolitical dimension 
of their wider strategies of reproduction—that contravened any pure logic of 
informal empire. The most cursory glance at the history of international rela-
tions reveals a wide gamut of different conﬁgurations between territoriality 
and capitalist states. From the establishment of the liberal trade system of the 
Pax Britannica and the ‘New Imperialism’ of Salisbury or Chamberlain, with 
its oscillation between ‘formal’ and ‘informal empire’, via the territorially 
expansive and economically autarchic Lebensraum conceptions of German 
Geopolitik and the Japanese project of a ‘Greater East-Asian Co-Prosperity 
Sphere’, to the us-sponsored (but multilateral) postwar liberal world order 
and contemporary European integration; the historical record exhibits an 
immense co-variation in the nexus between capitalist states and projects of 
territorialization. To negate these historical ﬂuctuations, as aberrations from 
a ‘normal’ correlation between capitalism and the classical states-system, 
would be to reify a structuralist view of an essentially invariant international 
order. The reality is that capitalist states have adopted different ‘strategies 
of territorialization’, ranging from the grant of full juridical independence 
to subaltern states, via semi-hegemonic projects like the eu, to systems of 
outright territorial control in the pursuit of Lebensraum or ‘formal Empire’. 
What an understanding of these diverse strategies of spatialization requires 
is an agency-centred perspective that emphasizes the variable politics of ter-
ritorialization, rather than a logic of empire or a logic of capital.
His historical-conceptual survey concluded, Münkler proceeds in the 
ﬁnal chapter of Imperien to draw out its implications for the current conjunc-
ture. Where are we today in terms of the Augustan threshold? How do his 
reﬂections on the geopolitical constellation that binds together the us and 
eu square with his historical ﬁndings? Here, against claims that we are wit-
nessing the end of the imperial age (advanced, among others, by his muse 
Michael Mann) and the dawn of a new world order, announced by Ulrich 
Beck or Jürgen Habermas, of global ‘governance’, prospectively human-
ist in inspiration—notions repeated by countless observers after the end 
of the Cold War—Münkler reminds us of the fate of post-imperial spaces. 
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Hobsbawm’s Age of Extremes serves as a referent. The dismantling of the 
Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, and the trimming to size of Soviet Russia 
at Versailles and Brest-Litovsk, failed to produce a stable post-imperial order 
in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. National self-determination was an 
idealist pipe-dream and, in conditions of British decline and American 
isolationism, invited the re-imposition of imperial order—Molotov and 
Ribbentrop shaking hands in Moscow. With the Hitler–Stalin Pact, geo-
politics trumped ideology.
Similar dynamics repeated themselves in the post-colonial and post-
Soviet cycles of more recent history. Decolonization and post-colonial 
state-formation were a function of the Cold War, as the post-colonial state 
remained dependent on direct imperial support throughout the division 
of the world into a bi-polar order. The post-Cold War era revealed these 
states—in Africa, the Near and Middle East, the Caucasus, Central Asia, 
Central and South America (sic) and parts of Southeast Asia—as defective 
artefacts, requiring imperial re-stabilization. The successor states of the 
ussr were either re-integrated into or propped up by imperial actors—eu, 
Russia, us—or sank into the ‘failed’ category. The post-imperial condition 
rests on a paradox: it requires an imperial power that provides stability and 
order until post-imperial actors are fortiﬁed as independent states—Niall 
Ferguson’s ‘imperialism of anti-imperialism’. Hobsbawm’s short 20th cen-
tury conﬁrms the bloody dialectic between imperial order and multiple 
state-formation. One might even say that states-systems, or what is errone-
ously known as the ‘Westphalian system’, are a world-historical exception, 
rather than the rule. Even more pointedly: states-systems live off the pres-
ence of imperial guarantors.
Given these historical precedents, the current unilateralism of us power 
politics lies within the trend line of the logic of empire. It is not the expres-
sion of a neo-conservative revolution in the us Administration, but the 
result of the transhistorical imperatives of empire, driven not so much by 
the subjective belligerence of the centre as by the objective demands of a 
crumbling periphery. Yet there is a further twist in the plot. For Münkler 
detects a dilemma at the very heart of us foreign policy. Carefully avoiding 
the indicative for the conditional, he writes of one scenario:
The us would view itself as essentially the guarantor of intensifying economic 
relations between Europe, America and East Asia, assuming the role of an 
‘imaginary total capitalist’ [ideeller Gesamtkapitalist] . . . whose most important 
duties would be to ensure the legal ordering of this economic space, to fore-
stall military competition in it, to establish monetary and exchange stability, 
to maintain technological superiority over its immediate environment, and to 
provide security against external threats; in short: to carry out those tasks that 





The current difﬁculty is, however, that this prospect is contradicted by 
another and—for many signiﬁcant forces in America—no less compelling 
one: the spread of democracy and human rights to the furthest corners of the 
earth. There is a tension between imperial mission, in principle boundless 
in reach, and imperial interest, limited to the trizonal empire—regulated 
not by ultra-imperialism, but supervised by the hyper-empire. Cautiously, 
Münkler suggests that a messianic commitment to human rights may con-
stitute a ‘moral luxury’ that could negate the logic of empire. ‘An intelligent 
imperial policy would turn away from global problems and secure itself by 
the erection of “imperial frontiers against barbarism”’. Of course, matters are 
not quite as simple as that. Massive military intervention beyond the impe-
rial heartland does conform to the logic of empire if strategic resources are 
at stake. Oil is the ‘Achilles heel’ of the us empire, outside its natural perim-
eter but vital for its economic reproduction, and so—quite sensibly—worth 
many an expedition to the Gulf:
Military interventions for the safeguarding and control of oil supplies are 
rational and lie within the logic of an empire oriented towards economic 
prosperity; interventions to put a stop to civil wars outside the imperial heart-
land, accompanied by nation-building, are irrational.
But there is a ﬂy in the ointment. Given the imperial mission—peace, 
prosperity, liberty, civilization—some may demur at the open pursuit of 
imperial interest in an age of democracy and global media coverage. As 
one autonomous source of us power, military might, goes into overdrive, 
another autonomous source of us power, ideological attraction—that 
‘self-binding discourse’—ebbs away. The greatest danger for America, 
Münkler concludes, is not imperial overstretch, but ‘moral overload’.
All this, of course, presumes that the us has crossed the ‘Augustan 
threshold’. But has it? Münkler prevaricates. In fact, when he arrives at the 
present, it becomes obvious that the notion is either counter-productive or 
superﬂuous. For if the suggestion is that it has not yet properly been crossed, 
then the billing of the us imperium as a paciﬁed political empire needs to be 
revoked, as the persistence of ‘out-of-area’ military operations conducted by 
what remains a democratic-republican polity contradicts the post-threshold 
logic of empire—inner-imperial consolidation. If, on the other hand, the 
argument is that it has been crossed, then it has to be shown that the eu and 
East Asia are incorporated or subsumed into the American Empire; and that 
some constitutional counterpart to a transition from republican-democratic 
to authoritarian-imperial rule has occurred within the United States. Nor 
is it easy to identify much consistency in us foreign policy since the end 
of the Cold War, as policy-changes and associated ‘self-binding’ discourses 
proliferate: from ‘full spectrum dominance’ through ‘American primacy’ to 
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‘human rights’ and ‘democracy-promotion’, from ‘counter-proliferation’ to 
‘regime change’, from the ‘war on terror’ and back to ‘nation-building’. The 
plain fact is that Washington is not Rome, and Bush is not Augustus, or 
even—liberal vapourings aside—Nero or Caligula. Münkler’s contradictions 
here are not merely the result of forcing a complex geopolitical conjuncture 
into the Procrustean bed of an objectiﬁed imperial logic of his own imagi-
nation, but of his astonishing omission of the wider geo-strategic ﬁeld of 
international force. The rise of China and, to a lesser extent, the re-assertion 
of Russia and India, remain off-screen.
What is one to make of Imperien? Intellectually speaking, it might 
look at ﬁrst glance like something of a return to the imposing tradition 
of German historical and sociological reﬂections on state and power—
therewith pre-eminently empire too—that produced the great works of 
Hintze and Weber. But although Münkler’s imperial optic recalls the ﬁrst, 
and his recourse to ideal-types the second, in any substantial sense these 
are quite tenuous connexions. The depth of Hintze’s comparative con-
struction of the connexions between feudalism, religion and empire, the 
passion of Weber’s world-historical tracking of rationalization, are far away. 
Schmitt and Clausewitz remain absent presences, while the neo-Rankean 
renaissance in German historiography goes largely unnoticed. Münkler’s 
real afﬁliations, like that of the great majority of his colleagues, are with the 
Anglosphere. But by the standard of the major historical works of American 
thinkers in the ﬁeld, Imperien is a lightweight contribution. 
At the outset of his work, Münkler remarks that ‘if we distinguish 
between theories of empire and theories of imperialism, we can leave the 
normative-evaluative perspective that is common to virtually all theories 
of imperialism behind, and move towards a more descriptive-analytical 
approach in order to capture the imperial imperatives of action’. The ﬁrst 
part of this sentence conveys the intent of Imperien more accurately than the 
second. Münkler, if only by reason of his past, is well versed in modern—
Marxist and non-Marxist—theories of imperialism; but these are above all 
what he wishes to banish from the ‘logic of empire’. Imperialisms carry 
too inconvenient a freight of association: genocide, racism, sponsored 
inter-community warfare, mass displacements, partitions, plunder, dispos-
session, slavery, rape, epidemics, famines, to name but a few. Even the most 
cursory reﬂection on the tensions between ‘self-binding’ imperial discourse 
and imperial reality would require some attention to them, but they disap-
pear from sight in Imperien. That does not mean, however, that Münkler 
abandons any ‘normative-evaluative perspective’, as he claims to do. Simply, 






For what is its political message? Essentially, that the time of the classi-
cal states-system based on territorial sovereignty, diplomatic reciprocity and 
political symmetry, as the model of a global order, is over. The current impe-
rial drive of us foreign policy not only lies within the historical trend line of 
the cyclical dynamics of empires. It is actually desirable, as the necessary 
means to stabilize the world order against threatening intruders—terrorists, 
migrants and failed states alike. For its part, the European Union needs to 
become a ‘sub-imperial system’ centred on the axis of Berlin, Paris and—
crucially, so Münkler hopes, in the near future—London. To that end, its 
inner relations need to be streamlined into a more functional and hierarchi-
cal system, and its frontiers transformed into ﬂexible zones of differentiated 
and retractable rights, policed by a Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
with a corresponding strike force to intervene where necessary in its march-
lands to the east and south-east. The prize is to gain—not in conﬂict, but in 
cooperation with the American suzerain—a place in the sun. 
With these prescriptions, Münkler’s ostensible value-neutrality, invoking 
the objective record of history in the name of social-scientiﬁc concept-
formation, capsizes and resurfaces as a normatively recharged set of policy 
recommendations: a manual for an updated Germano-European imperial-
ism ﬁt for the 21st century. While Weber would have had little compunction 
in embracing this new gunboat diplomacy, his intellectual code would not 
have allowed him to hide gesinnungsethische convictions behind the façade 
of scientiﬁc analysis. For in the end, Münkler’s geopolitical prescriptions 
are not the product of a historical derivation, but constitute simply a set of 
assertions—a politics for empire rather than a concept of empire—driven by 
the opportunities of the moment. The rehabilitation of empire is carried out 
with a more ﬂamboyant brio in the Anglosphere, where defence and illustra-
tion of the American imperium can be conducted in more swaggering style 
by writers like Ferguson or Kaplan. But Europe is now producing its own 
crop of apologists, explaining the need for a subaltern empire in the Old 
World, in fealty to a global overlord in the New. These are no longer marg-
inal voices. The pioneer theorist of Europe’s imperial mission today, Robert 
Cooper, has been—in succession—security advisor to Blair in Downing 
Street, to Prodi in Brussels and now to the roving Solana. Münkler offers 
a German version of the same vision, from Berlin. Mutatis mutandis, his 
project might be compared to Carl Schmitt’s bid to re-position himself in the 
late thirties with texts on Grossraumordnungen tailored to the concerns of the 
authorities. The new eu will provide ample space for such exercises. 
